In France we had gone shopping for Mirages. A top Air Force delegation had gone to purchase 36 Mirages from France. The deal was almost closed and we were going to fly-in our orders, to take delivery. Somebody around here—I do not know where they come from—stopped us, the deal was cancelled and we were promised that we would be given MIG-23s, instead of Mirages. We called off the deal with France and waited, and in fact we are still waiting; and this was some two or three years ago. After months of waiting, we were finally told that the supply would not be made of MIG-23 but an improved version of MIG-21 because it would be better all the way round and, in any case, we would be able to manufacture it later on in our own country. The Russians are very clever. They know exactly what will touch us. As soon as they say that they are giving us something which we will be able to manufacture in the country before long, we will immediately fall a prey to it, or we will use it as an excuse for doing the wrong thing, instead of doing the right thing.
By this time, the Air Force brass was thoroughly fed up and went back to France for the Mirages. “Sorry,” said France. They said that production is booked for the next four years. In the first instance, the Mirage was available off the shelf because these Mirages had been produced for Israel, but because of the arms embargo that France had placed on Israel, they were going to be sold. But then we were not prepared to buy. When we went back to them again, we were told that we have to wait for four years, because they have already sold these Mirages.
The delegation then moved on to England to negotiate for the Jaguar aircraft, which was being offered on very favourable terms. Again, the Russian got wind of the deal, again they promised the MIG-23, again we fell for their line, and once again the MIG-23 never materialised.
Then the Russians pleaded genuine difficulties because of the Arab-Israeli war and asked us to be patient. We felt that they would not be in a position to supply arms to us until this is over. So, we had to wait till the war was over. When, after the war, we demanded from the Russians the same weapons that they had supplied to the Arabs and Syrians, especially the SAM 6 missiles, the MlG-23, some naval craft and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which incidentally the Russians had been promising us, instead of the Nimrod aircraft being negotiated with the British, the Russians said that they would fulfil our demands after the Middle East situation stabilised.
Even after the Middle East situation had stabilised, no supplies were forthcoming in 1974. Learning of the heavy Pakistan rearmament programme, which incidentally is one of the election weapon of the Congress Party—the way they have been talking of the lifting of the arms embargo, which has been lifted for both India and Pakistan but which they keep referring to as “arm aid to Pakistan”—this shows how their mind is functioning. This is the main weapon in the Congress armoury for the forthcoming elections. Because Pakistan is arming itself, we again went to France for similar stores, including the Crotale missile, which is better than SAM 6, I am told. The then-Defence Minister, Shri Jagjivan Ram, went to the Soviet Union in July 1974 with his shopping list and his visit was followed by that of the Defence Secretary, Shri Govind Narain. We were, in fact, still shopping all over the world when the top brass delegation of Marshal Grechko with all the Generals and all the medals in the world descended on India. It is the most heavy-weighted, the most highly medalised delegation that has ever left Soviet soil, let alone arrived on Indian soil. The Grechko team, armed with their own worldwide intelligence reports, threw South Block into a panic, telling us how much India was in danger, telling us about all that was going on around us and how we had to be careful. They were, in fact, so much concerned about our interests that they agreed to supply us all the hardware we wanted.
The Russians are touchy about their equipment. There were only a few minor conditions attached because the Russians were very touchy about their equipment after what the Egyptians did in the Arab-Israel war. So, they suggested that we must have Russian exports. They are touchy about their equipment, particularly if it should not prove a match for other Western equipment because it will be very bad for their sales. If their equipment did not stand up to the keen competition from the rest of the world, it would be bad for the Russians. The Russian economy’s main prop in export trade is the sale of arms. To “protect the reputation” of their precious arms, which our “unsophisticated” jawans may not be able to handle properly, they insisted that we accept Russian instructors on the Egyptian level. Egypt, with an army of one-third of our size, had 22,000 Russian experts and instructors. I suppose, in India, that figure would go beyond 60,000. I remember the experts Americans had sent to Vietnam some 20 years ago. They were only 22,000 advisers or experts—you call it what you may. We know with what disastrous consequences.
It is in order to train our people and to handle the equipment that we are now threatened with something like 60,000 or more experts from the Soviet Union. I do not know. They also agreed to supply immediately, as a palliative, six Corvettes, one submarine and some maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which might be on its way.
I do not mind what the Government is doing and, particularly, in matters of defence. I think these decisions should be left to the Government because they know more about it than most Members there will be able to know. But I want them to inform the public, not hide behind some vague notions of security. What is happening in India is very well known to everybody else in the world except Indians. It is more known to everybody else outside the House than it is known to Members of Parliament. I do not know why this cloak should be put over security, should be put over defence, in the name of national interest. It creates a completely wrong opinion. If I say something which is true, I am sure, there is nobody else in the world who does not know about it. If I say something which is not true, then you should be thankful to me for having misled the world.
Swaran Singh (Defence Minister): If this is your criterion, I must say that today, you have admirably succeeded in misleading the world.
Piloo Mody: You have done your job and I have done mine. His job is to mislead the House and my job is to inform the country.
Swaran Singh: Mislead the world.
Piloo Mody: How can we, with 60,000 Russian instructors on our soil, maintain our posture of non-alignment?
Swaran Singh: Sir. I would not like to enter into arguments at this stage. But I would like to say that this information the Hon’ble Member is giving is totally incorrect. There was no suggestion of experts, much less of a figure that he is mentioning. I do not know from where he has got this information. This creates an absolutely wrong impression in the country and abroad.
Shyam Nandan Mishra (Begusarai): You mean, there was no suggestion about Russian military advisers?
Swaran Singh: There is absolutely no suggestion of military advisers.
Piloo Mody: I am glad the Minister has taken two opportunities to deny it and when the time comes for him to reply to the debate, he can deny it again. Further, they offered to supply a large part of this equipment free of cost provided we join an Asian Security Pact. Let me be fair to the Hon’ble Sardarji.
I may say that the South Block has not yet made up its mind whether it should or should not accept the large number of Russian instructors, and nobody has made up his mind about the Asian Security Pact proposition. Therefore, I would like him to differentiate, when he replies, between what was said and that he doesn’t want us to know, what is the current thinking of the Government, and what will finally be agreed to. These are three different things.
It was Mr Grechko who first mooted the idea of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in 1969 and the Treaty was finally signed in August 1971. Incidentally, our Hon’ble minister, who was Foreign Minister at that time, did not even know that we were going to sign this Treaty—I made it clear on the last occasion—and, possibly, what was discussed with Grechko either.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have demanded a Russian naval base in India, either in Vizag or Andaman/Nicobar. This is also something which they cannot probably decide on because they are much too afraid of public opinion or something like that. However, is it true, Minister, that India is likely to use its good offices to try and secure for the Russians the now-abandoned Maldives base, which the British are giving up? You might throw some light on that also.
A Member of my Party exposed the UN map of the Indian Ocean, which gave various configurations of the various super powers and smaller powers in the Indian Ocean. I hope the Hon’ble Minister has studied that also. That perhaps explains Mrs Indira Gandhi’s constant but imaginary threat of aggression from the sea. This is perhaps the second weapon of the Congress Party—saying that there may be an attack from the sea and making it an excuse for giving the Soviets a base. I think this is rather a little too delicate for me to be able to say positively, or she is probably trying to find some justification for succumbing to the Soviet demand, which she is in no position to reject outright. In return for all this “friendship” and help and to sweeten the package, half a dozen Corvettes and a submarine are already on their way to India—for which we are thankful to them.
This is part of ThePrint’s Great Speeches series. It features speeches and debates that shaped modern India.
